Texas Civil Procedure by Figari, Ernest E., Jr. et al.
SMU Law Review
Volume 37
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 13
1983
Texas Civil Procedure
Ernest E. Figari Jr.
Thomas A. Graves
A. Erin Dwyer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation




Ernest E. Fgari, Jr. *
Thomas 4. Graves**
.4. Erin Dwyer***
HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
survey period are found in judicial decisions and amendments to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.' This Article examines these
developments and considers their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
The court considered the impact of an increase in the alleged amount in
controversy on subject matter jurisdiction in Mr. W Fireworks, Inc. v.
Mitchell.2 As originally filed, the plaintiffs petition alleged damages
within the $5,000 jurisdictional limit of the county court at law. 3 By trial
amendment, however, the plaintiff abandoned his prayer for $750.00 in
attorneys' fees and substituted a claim for "reasonable attorney's fees,"
thereby permitting a recovery in excess of the jurisdictional limit. The trial
court awarded the plaintiff a judgment for $6,803.30, $5,760.00 of which
represented attorney's fees. The court of civil appeals reversed, holding
that the trial amendment was ineffective to increase the amount sought
above the jurisdictional limit and thus modified the judgment to award
only $750.00 in attorneys' fees. 4 Following two earlier cases,5 the supreme
* B.S., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•* B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dal-
las, Texas.
i. The amendments modified TEX. R. Civ. P. 452 and 749(C) and added TEX. R. Civ.
P. 742(a) and 747(a). These changes became effective Aug. 15, 1982. See Supreme Court
Amends Rules of Civil Procedure Effective Aug. 15, 1982, 45 TEX. B.J. 789 (1982).
2. 622 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. 1981) (per curiam).
3. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970a (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-1982).
4. 622 S.W.2d at 577.
5. Flynt v. Garcia, 587 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam) (when original suit was
within jurisdictional limits of court and subsequent amendment sought only damages accru-
ing because of passage of time, county court had power to entertain suit even though trial
amendment raised amount in controversy over maximum jurisdictional limit); Cantu v. J.
Weingarten's, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1981, writ refd
n.r.e.) (plaintiffs amended original petition, which increased total amount of claimed dam-
ages beyond court's jurisdictional limits, did not deprive court of jurisdiction absent proof
from defendant that allegations in plaintiffs original petition were made in bad faith); see
Haginas v. Malbis Memorial Found., 163 Tex. 274, 354 S.W.2d 368 (1962); Isbell v. Kenyon-
Warner Dredging Co., 113 Tex. 528, 261 S.W. 762 (1924).
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court reversed the appellate court decision. Noting that the plaintiff ap-
parently amended his petition to recover the attorneys' fees accruing since
the filing of the suit, the court reiterated the rule in Flynt v. Garcia6 that
"[w]here jurisdiction is once lawfully and properly acquired, it will not be
defeated by subsequent amendments seeking any additional damages that
are accruing because of the passage of time." 7
II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The reach of the Texas long-arm statute, article 203 1b, 8 continued to be
the subject of judicial measurement. Section 3 of article 2031b provides
that when a nonresident "engages in business in this State," the statute
authorizes service on the nonresident "in any action, suit or proceedings
arising out of such business."9 This "arising out of" language has raised
questions concerning a plaintiffs right to establish personal jurisdiction
under article 2031b on nonresidents on the basis of activities unrelated to
the asserted cause of action. State court decisions have opted for a broader
construction of the statute, concluding that article 2031b reaches federal
constitutional limits.' 0 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit, applying article
2031b more literally, held during the survey period that the statute ex-
pressly limits its application to causes of action "arising out of' activities
done within the state, thereby falling short of the reach permitted by the
federal Constitution." Rejecting this interpretation, the Texas Supreme
6. 587 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1979).
7. 622 S.W.2d at 577.
8. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983).
9. Id § 3 (Vernon 1964).
10. See, e.g., U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) ("art. 203 1b reaches as far as the federal constitutional require-
ments of due process will permit"); Michigan Gen. Corp. v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, Inc., 582
S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd) ("the reach of article 2031b is
limited only by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution"); N.K. Par-
rish, Inc. v. Schrimscher, 516 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ)
("the statute represents an effort by Texas to extend its inpersonam jurisdiction over non-
residents to the maximum permitted by the federal constitutional requirements of due pro-
cess"); see also Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974)
("article 203 lb represents an effort by Texas to reach as far as federal constitutional require-
ments of due process will permit in exercising jurisdiction over the persons of nonresident
defendants"); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973)
("[a]rticle 2031 b represents an effort by Texas to exploit to the fullest the limits of in per-
sonam jurisdiction"); Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 73
(5th Cir. 1961) ("the Texas purpose [in enacting art. 2031b] was to exploit to the maximum
the fullest permissible reach under federal constitutional restraints"); Clark Advertising
Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D. Tex. 1971), ail'd, 490 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.
1974) ("[t]he Texas 'long-arm statute' .. is to be given the broadest possible construction,
subject only to basic constitutional requirements"); Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction,- Article
2031b, the Texas "Long-Arm" Jurisdiction Statute,- and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdic-
tion in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEX. L. REV. 279, 307 (1964).
11. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed in Figari,
Graves, & Gordon, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 435,
436-37 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Figari, 1982 Annual Survey]; see Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686
F.2d 276, 295 (5th Cir. 1982); Jim Fox Enters., Inc. v. Air France, 664 F.2d 63 (5th Cir.
1981); Placid Invs., Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 662 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated
on rehearing, 689 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Court in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 12 authorita-
tively ruled that business contacts unrelated to the asserted cause of action
are relevant to and will support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under
article 203 lb.13 Reaffirming that the Texas long-arm statute reaches as far
as due process will permit, the supreme court emphasized that while a
nexus between the asserted cause of action and the defendant's contacts
with the forum state is helpful when considering jurisdiction, such a nexus
is not required when the nonresident defendant's presence in the forum
through numerous contacts satisfies the demands of due process. 14 The
Fifth Circuit, bound by the Erie doctrine,15 subsequently reversed its prior
decisions and followed Hall's lead. 16
Intent on improving the accuracy of its predictions of Texas law in this
area, the Fifth Circuit focused on rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.' 7 Since a plaintiff has the option of relying upon rule 108 to
effect service on a nonresident in either state or federal court, 18 the Fifth
Circuit in Placid Investments, Ltd v. Girard Trust Bank 19 confronted the
question of whether rule 108 could serve as a less restrictive substitute for
article 2031b. Answering in the negative, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
a rule of procedure propounded by the Texas Supreme Court could not be
used to circumvent the substantive jurisdictional requirements the Texas
Legislature developed in article 2031 b because it would nullify the arti-
cle. 20 In view of two earlier state court decisions that provide a more lib-
eral Texas reading of rule 108,21 the Fifth Circuit's forecast of Texas law
12. 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270, - L. Ed. 2d - (1983).
13. Id. at 872; see Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685-86 (5th Cir. 1977);
Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., 554 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977);
Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234-35 (5th Cir. 1973); Coulter v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1318-19 (5th Cir. 1970); Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414
F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1969); Hopper v. Mayeaux, 545 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (S.D. Tex. 1982);
Well Servs., Ltd. v. Pyramid Derrick & Equip. Corp., 526 F. Supp. 481, 484-85 (S.D. Tex.
1981); Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1220 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (cases holding
that business contacts unrelated to the asserted cause of action can support personal jurisdic-
tion under art. 203 lb).
14. 638 S.W.2d at 872.
15. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536, 540-
41 (5th Cir. 1964); Hopper v. Mayeaux, 545 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
16. Placid Invs., Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 689 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1982), vacat-
ig 662 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1982).
17. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108. Rule 108 authorizes service on a nonresident or absent defend-
ant "to the fullest extent that he may be required to appear and answer under the Constitu-
tion of the United States in an action either in rem or in personam." Id
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (authorizing service in federal court on nonresidents in
same manner prescribed in statute or rule of court of the state in which the federal court is
held). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1112-1113 (1969).
19. 662 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated on rehearing, 689 F.2d 1218 (1982); see Wyatt
v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 285 n.18 (5th Cir. 1982).
20. 662 F.2d at 1179.
21. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 n.I (Tex. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (the purpose of the amendment to rule 108 is to secure in per-
sonam jurisdiction to constitutional limits); Fox v. Fox, 559 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1977, no writ) (rule 108 can be viewed as a long-arm statute to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction); see Grantham v. Aetna Life & Cas., 455 F. Supp. 440, 441 n. 1 (N.D. Tex.
19831
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on this point would appear to be less than accurate.
Siskind v. The Villa Foundation for Education, Inc. ,22 recently decided by
the Texas Supreme Court, is a substantive yardstick for measurement of
the Texas long-arm statute. In Siskind the supreme court adopted the "fi-
duciary shield" principle23 and applied it to the determination of the ame-
nability of nonresident officers or employees of a foreign corporation to
service under article 2031 b for acts they performed in the forum state on
behalf of the corporation. 24 The plaintiff, a Texas parent of a minor who
had been enrolled in a specialized school that a foreign corporation in Ari-
zona operated, sued the corporation and four of its officers who were Ari-
zona residents for breach of contract and fraud. Service was effected on
each defendant under article 2031 b. The trial court dismissed the suit as to
all of the defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. On review the supreme court sustained nonresident service upon
the defendant corporation. 25 The court emphasized that the school had
continuously advertised its services in Texas and had mailed numerous
informational packets, applications for enrollment, and enrollment con-
tracts to residents of Texas.26 Affirming the dismissal of the individual
defendants, however, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to assert that
the individual defendants had committed any act in Texas apart from their
employer's business activities.27 The supreme court shielded the individ-
ual defendants from the jurisdictional effect of these acts by proclaiming
that nonresident employees of a foreign corporation cannot be sued in
Texas solely because the employer solicits business in Texas; the defend-
ant's contacts are the determining factor.28
1978); see also W. DORSANEO, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 32-50[2], at 32-18 (1981) (use of
rule 108 when it cannot be shown that statutory method provided actual notice of suit to
nonresident); Figari, 1982 Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 436 (rule 108 offers full constitu-
tional reach in effecting service upon nonresident); Sampson, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Marries
the Texas Family Code, 38 TEX. B.J. 1023, 1033 n.20 (1975) (rule 108 can be construed as
procedural enabling provision ratifying existing long-arm statutes); Weintraub, Hall v.
Helicopteros: The Texas Long-Arm's Grasp Exceeds Its Reach, 2 TEX. B. LITIGATION SEC.
REP. 1, 4-5 (1983). But see Letter from Hans W. Baade to the Texas Bar Journal (Dec.
1975), reprinted in 38 TEX. B.J. 988 (1975) (rule 108 as an impermissible extension of the
Texas long-arm statute).
22. 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982).
23. The "fiduciary shield" principle provides: "[I]f an individual has contact with a
particular state only by virtue of his acts as a fiduciary of the corporation, he may be
shielded from the exercise, by that state, of jurisdiction over him personally on the basis of
that conduct." Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981);
accord Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co., 504 F.2d 927, 929 (5th Cir. 1974) (jurisdiction over the
corporation's individual officers cannot be based solely upon jurisdiction over the corpora-
tion); Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1281 n.8 (10th Cir. 1969) (even if a foreign
corporation is subject to service because it transacts business through agents operating in the
forum state, unless the agents transact business on their own behalf apart from the corpora-
tion, such agents are not engaged in business so as to allow the application of the long-arm
statute to them as individuals).
24. 642 S.W.2d at 434.
25. Id at 435.
26. Id.




Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A. ,29 reported in a previous sur-
vey period, provided encouragement to recalcitrant defendants involved in
jurisdictional contests in federal forums. In that case the Fifth Circuit
found the fourteenth amendment precluded a trial court from establishing
personal jurisdiction as a sanction for the failure to comply with discovery
orders directing disclosure of jurisdictional facts.30 The United States
Supreme Court, however, rejected this holding in Insurance Corp. of Ire-
land, Ltd v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea.3 1 In Compagnie des Baux-
ites the Court concluded that when the defendant has intentionally
resisted discovery of jurisdictional facts the establishment of personal ju-
risdiction as a sanction does not violate due process. 32 Observing that "[a]
defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default
judgment and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a
collateral proceeding, ' 33 the Court maintained that "by submitting to the
jurisdiction of the court for the limited purpose of challenging jurisdiction,
the defendant agrees to abide by that court's determination on the issue of
jurisdiction. '34
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
Rule 120a, which governs special appearances to challenge personal ju-
risdiction in state court, requires a party making a special appearance to
file a sworn motion prior to any other pleading or motion.35 As originally
adopted, rule 120a contained no provision allowing an amendment of the
29. 629 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981). Contra Compa-
gnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981), afl'd
sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 102 S. Ct.
2099, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1982); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.
1971).
30. 629 F.2d at 1138-39. The plaintiffs sued two nonresident corporations seeking re-
covery for damages arising from the sinking of a foreign vessel. Service was effected under
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1983), and the defendants
responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Attempting to establish
the defendants' contacts with the forum, the plaintiffs propounded interrogatories to the
defendants. The defendants evaded the discovery and, after a hearing on the matter, the
court ordered them to respond fully within a specified period. After the defendants failed to
comply with the order, the trial court entered a default judgment against them for their
contumacious conduct. On an appeal from the default judgment the appellate court reiter-
ated that in the federal courts the burden is on a plaintiff to establish jurisdiction when
challenged. The court noted, however, that in the instant case the plaintiffs had been pre-
cluded from presenting jurisdictional evidence in the exclusive possession of the defendants
because the defendants refused to disclose the information in response to discovery proce-
dures. 629 F.2d at 1139. Nevertheless, in finding that due process required the necessary
facts to be of record, the court of civil appeals held that the plaintiffs are not exempt from
the burden of proof even though they had been unable to obtain information from the de-
fendants. Id. ; see Figari, 1982 Annual Survey, supra, note 11, at 437-38.
31. 102 S. Ct. 2099, 72 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1982).
32. Id at 2103-04, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 501-02.
33. Id at 2106, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 504.
34. Id.
35. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a.
1983]
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special appearance motion to correct a deficiency. 36 Consequently, the
filing of an unsworn motion constituted a general appearance and sub-
jected the movant to the court's jurisdiction for all purposes.37 The
amended version of rule 120a, however, now permits amendments to spe-
cial appearance motions to cure defects.38 While focusing on this aspect of
the rule, the court of civil appeals in Carbonit Houston, Inc. v. Exchange
Bank 39 followed the lead of two earlier cases,40 and concluded that rule
120a permits an amendment to verify the motion. 4'
IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Two decisions during the survey period invalidated service of process on
the basis of inadvertent errors occurring during the execution of service.
In Kern P. Krueger42 an officer served a citation 123 days after its issuance
despite a stipulation in the citation that provided for a ninety-day limita-
tion on effectiveness. 43 Contending that the citation was void because the
officer failed to serve the citation within the ninety days, the defendant
sought to set aside a default judgment rendered against him on the basis of
the service. The appellate court concluded that the time requirement
stated in the citation for effecting service was mandatory, held that service
over the defendant consequently was void on its face, and invalidated the
default judgment.44
A similar error occurred in Exposition Apartments Co. v. Barba,45 in
which the petition directed that service be effected upon the defendant
company by serving the defendant's manager, "Mr. Thompson," at a
stated address. In accordance with this directive the citation recited service
on "Mr. Thompson." On appeal from a default judgment against the de-
fendant company, the court held that a record showing service on a repre-
sentative identified only by his surname was insufficient to support a
default judgment. 46
36. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a (Vernon 1966).
37. Stewart v. Walton Enters., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Austin Rankin Corp. v. Cadillac Pool Corp., 421 S.W.2d 733, 734
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, no writ).
38. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a. See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 294 (1976).
39. 628 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. See Stegall & Stegall v. Cohn, 592 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1979, no writ) (record did not support plaintiff's contention that defendants waived their
special appearance by failing to seek a hearing on the motion to dismiss); Dennett v. First
Continental Inv. Corp., 559 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ) (special
appearances may be amended to cure defects); cf. Duncan v. Denton County, 133 S.W.2d
197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd) (amendment of unsworn controverting
affidavit to add verification permitted).
41. 628 S.W.2d at 828.
42. 626 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
43. Id at 144; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 101.
44. 626 S.W.2d at 144;accord Lemoth v. Cimbalisat, 236 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1951, writ refd).
45. 630 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
46. Id at 465; accord Brown v. Robertson, 28 Tex. 555 (1866).
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Article 2.11 of the Texas Business Corporation Act 47 sets forth the pro-
cedure for effecting service on a corporation. This statute allows for serv-
ice of process on the secretary of state if a corporation's registered agent
cannot be located. The secretary of state then must send a copy of the
process by registered mail to the corporation's registered office. In Txxn,
Inc. v. D/FW Steel Co. 48 the service of process on the defendant corpora-
tion was made in this fashion, but the postal service returned the copy of
process with the notation that it was "Not Deliverable As Addressed, Un-
able to Forward. '49 Nevertheless, since the plaintiff had fulfilled the re-
quirements of article 2.11, the trial court entered a default judgment
against the corporation. Subsequently, the defendant corporation, which
apparently had not maintained a properly registered office, attacked the
default judgment by contending that due process had been violated be-
cause it had not received actual notice of the suit and the plaintiff knew the
defendant corporation's actual location. While the record indicated that
the plaintiff was aware that the corporation was operating a place of busi-
ness at a location other than the one listed with the secretary of state, the
appellate court held that this did not suggest it was amenable to service at
that address.5 0 The court found that due process had been met and held
that the, plaintiffs efforts at effecting service complied with article 2.11.51
Thus, the failure of this method of service resulted from the defendant's
failure to meet the statutory requirements of properly maintaining an ac-
curate registered office and not because of an omission by the plaintiff.5 2
The decision of Encore Builders v. Wells53 stands as a warning to plain-
tiffs' attorneys that in order to support a default judgment, the pleadings
must adequately allege the service agent's authority. In Wells the petition
merely alleged that the defendant was a business, without specifying the
type of business entity, and that its "agent for service of process is Mike
Catero.' ' 54 After service was effected on the agent, the defendant failed to
answer. The plaintiff then secured an interlocutory default judgment, and
after the default judgment had become final the defendant attacked it by
writ of error. Finding the plaintiffs pleadings insufficient to support a de-
fault judgment, the court of appeals set aside the judgment, emphasizing
that merely alleging agency will not permit a default judgment. 55
Newly enacted rule 742a, 56 which pertains to forcible entry and detainer
suits, contains the following provisions: It authorizes substituted service
upon the defendant-tenant by delivery of process to the premises in ques-
47. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon 1980).
48. 632 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
49. Id. at 708.
50. Id.
51. Id
52. Id at 709.
53. 636 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
54. Id at 722-23.
55. Id. at 723; accord White Motor Co. v. Loden, 373 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1963, no writ).
56. TEX. R. Civ. P. 742a.
1983]
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tion. When a sworn complaint lists all the defendant's known home and
work addresses in the country where the premises are located, and the rec-
ord reflects that the service officer was unsuccessful in effecting service
upon the defendant by either personal service or by leaving it with some-
one over sixteen years of age at his usual place of abode, the justice court
may authorize service upon defendant by delivery of process to the prem-
ises. Once the court authorizes such service, the serving officer must place
the citation inside the premises by inserting it through a mail chute or
slipping it under the front door at least six days before the return date, and
on the same or the next day he must send a copy by first class mail to the
defendant at the premises in question. An officer effecting substituted
service in this manner must note on the return both the date of delivery to
the premises and the date of mailing.
V. VENUE
The Texas comparative negligence statute, article 2212a, provides in sec-
tion 2(g) that "[a]l claims for contribution between named defendants in
the primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit."'57 As noted in a
prior survey 58 two conflicting interpretations have developed in the Texas
courts of appeals concerning the language "named defendants in the pri-
mary suit" and, thus, as to the venue provision's scope.59 This controversy
appears now to have been settled by the supreme court's recent decision in
Arthur Brothers, Inc. v. U. MC., Inc. 60 In Arthur Brothers the plaintiff filed
suit against three corporate defendants alleging negligence and other
claims. Since two of the original defendants filed third-party claims for
contribution and indemnity against another company, the plaintiff
amended its petition to include that company as the fourth named defend-
ant. The trial court sustained both the impleaded company's plea of privi-
lege to the plaintiffs claim and its plea to the third-party claim against it
for contribution. On appeal, however, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court and rendered judgment that the plea of privilege be denied as to
the third-party claim.6 1 That court held that under article 2212a the fourth
defendant became a "named defendant in the primary suit" when the two
original defendants filed their contribution claim against it.62 In a per
57. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
58. See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 359, 369(1981) [hereinafter cited as Figari, 1981 Annual Survey].
59. Compare Blair v. Thomas, 604 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ),
and Maintenance Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd) (cases holding that after nonresident defendant's
original plea of privilege was sustained he was no longer a "named" defendant in the origi-
nal action), with State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Trans. v. Hardy, 607 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1980, writ dism'd w.o.j.), and Gonzales v. Blake, 605 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ) (cases holding that defendant's cross claim for
contribution against co-defendants has to be determined in the primary suit).
60. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 143 (Dec. 15, 1982) (per curiam).
61. 626 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981). The plaintiff did not appeal
the trial court's order transferring his claim against the fourth defendant to another county.
62. Id at 822.
[Vol. 37
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curiam opinion refusing the third-party defendant's application for a writ
of error, the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals decision. 63 The
supreme court explained: "The purpose of article 2212a, section 2(g) is to
avoid separate trials of the plaintiff's claims against several defendants.
The purpose of the statute is best served by maintaining the contribution
claim in the original suit." TheArthur Brothers decision effectively over-
ruled State v. Reed,65 a case decided earlier in the survey period, which
held that article 2212a did not govern the venue of third-party actions.66
Gilstrap v. Beakley,67 involving a cross-claim one defendant filed against
its co-defendant, discussed venue of ancillary claims. The appellate court
first determined that the cross-claim had the same primary purpose, arose
out of the same transaction, and involved identical legal and factual issues
as the plaintiff's claim.68 The court of appeals then reiterated its holding in
Wallace v. Rockwell International Corp. 69 that cross-claims are maintain-
able in the county of the primary action to avoid multiplicity of suits. 70
The Middlebrook doctrine is a long-standing venue rule predicated on
the public policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits.71 Under this doctrine,
a plaintiff who in good faith asserts two or more claims properly joined in
a single action against the same defendant can maintain venue upon all of
the claims in a county where venue is proper as to one of the claims. 72
Earlier cases focusing on the relative size of the claims suggested that the
Middlebrook doctrine does not apply when the cause of action upon which
venue is predicated is merely incidental to the main cause of action.73 The
court in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Moore,74 however, followed the current,
more progressive view75 and concluded that the relative magnitude of the
relief sought in the separate claims was not controlling.76 According to the
reasoning in Moore, courts should not scrutinize each claim separately to
establish dominance of a single cause of action over the other; but rather,
"public policy favors conferring venue on all properly joined causes of
63. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 144.
64. Id
65. 626 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
66. Id at 186 (citing Chancy v. Coleman Co., 567 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1978, no writ), discussed in Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33
Sw. L.J. 455, 464 (1979)).
67. 636 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
68. Id at 740.
69. 568 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1978, no writ).
70. 636 S.W.2d at 741.
71. See Middlebrook v. David Bradley Mfg. Co., 86 Tex. 706, 26 S.W. 935 (1894).
72. Id, 26 S.W.2d at 935.
73. See, e.g., Auto Ref. Corp. v. Smith, 84 S.W.2d 296, 297 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1935, no writ); Bateman v. McGee, 50 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1932,
no writ).
74. 630 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ dism'd).
75. See Lindsey v. Security Say. Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977,
no writ); Brazos Valley Harvestore Sys., Inc. v. Beavers, 535 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, writ dism'd); Burke v. Scott, 400 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1966, writ dism'd). See generally Figari, supra note 66, at 464.
76. 630 S.W.2d at 453.
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action to avoid a multiplicity of suits."'77
The court in Rodriguez v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. 78 confronted the ques-
tion of the effect an appellate court's reversal of an order overruling a plea
of privilege has on a trial court's intervening judgment in favor of the de-
fendant. After the trial court in that case overruled the defendant's plea of
privilege, the defendant timely filed an appeal from the venue decision.
The court of appeals sustained the plea of privilege. 79 The plaintiffs, how-
ever, applied for a writ of error with the supreme court, and the court
suspended the transfer of the case pending final determination of the ap-
peal. Meanwhile, the trial court continued to exercise jurisdiction over the
suit following its entry of the order overruling the plea of privilege. 80
Before the appellate courts completed their review of the venue decision,
the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the entire case with
prejudice.
In a divided opinion, the Corpus Christi court of appeals reversed the
judgment of dismissal and remanded the case to the transferee county for a
new trial.8' Citing a line of other Texas court decisions, the majority con-
cluded that sustaining the plea of privilege divested the trial court of juris-
diction to decide the case on the merits. 82 Since the trial court order
dismissed the case without jurisdictional support, the court of appeals
found it immaterial that the judgment resolving the whole case favored the
defendant. 83 The dissent on the other hand claimed that requiring a de-
fendant who has already obtained a favorable judgment to retry the case
simply because the trial court erroneously refused to transfer the case to
the defendant's domicile was illogical and against public policy.84 Relying
on a dictum in Goolsby v. Bond,85 the dissent favored the reversal of the
trial court's judgment only when the venue was decided against the
defendant. 86
Carrasco v. Goatcher87 is a warning that a party seeking a change of
venue due to prejudice and bias against him in the county of suit must
77. Id
78. 638 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
79. Jim Walter Homes v. Altreche, 605 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1980, writ dism'd).
80. See Allen v. Woodward, I ll Tex. 457, 239 S.W. 602 (1922) (plaintiff may proceed
with the litigation on the merits when a plea of privilege is overruled). But see Long v.
Compton, 398 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, no writ) (perfection of appeal
from order overruling a plea of privilege deprives the trial court of jurisdiction).
81. 638 S.W.2d at I11.
82. Id. at 110; see Service Fin. Corp. v. Grote, 172 S.W.2d 996 (Tex. Civ, App.--San
Antonio 1943, no writ); Conlee v. Burton, 188 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942, no
writ); Wilson v. Ryan, 163 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, no writ); Smith
v. First Nat'l Bank, 147 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1941, no writ); O'Brien v.
Smith, 80 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1935, no writ). All of these cases, however,
involved a reversal of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
83. 638 S.W.2d at I11.
84. Id. (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
85. 138 Tex. 485, 490, 163 S.W.2d 830, 833 (1942).
86. 638 S.W.2d at Ill (Gonzales, J., dissenting).
87. 623 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
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comply with the strict proof requirements of rule 25788 in order to invoke
the trial court's discretion to transfer the cause. Rule 257 provides that to
apply for change of venue in those circumstances a party must support his
application with his own affidavit and the affidavits of three credible per-
sons residing in the county of suit.89 In Carrasco the application for
change of venue was accompanied only by the plaintiffs affidavit and that
of her granddaughter, who was not a resident of the county of suit. Al-
though the court of appeals acknowledged that broad discretion to transfer
a cause vests in the trial court when such an application is made, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs application failed since it did not comply
with the proof requirements established under the rule.90 Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing the plaintiffs request for
transfer because the plaintiffs defective application was insufficient to in-
voke the initial trial court discretion.91 In a dictum, the court noted that a
party might be excused from furnishing the required affidavits because of
the degree of prejudice against him, but the court then concluded that the
plaintiff had failed to adduce any evidence correlating with that
contention.92
A statutory development of significance to bank practitioners occurred
in the survey period when the United States Congress amended the venue
provision for -national banks. Prior to its amendment section 94 of the
National Bank Act mandated that state court suits against national banks
be brought in the county or city of the bank's principal place of business. 93
The Depository Institutions Act of 1982, however, restricts the scope of the
national bank venue privilege by limiting its application to national banks
for which a receiver has been appointed. 94 Thus, in the future the venue of
most suits against national banks should be governed by the general venue
statute.95
VI. PLEADINGS
Rule 185 provides that a suit on a sworn account "shall be taken as
prima facie evidence thereof, unless the party resisting such claim shall
. . . file a written denial, under oath, stating [1] that each and every item is
not just or true, or [2] that some specified item or items are not just and
true.,' 96 In Special Marine Products, Inc. v. Weeks Welding & Construction,
Inc. 97 the defendant filed a sworn denial that the account "was not just or
88. TEX. R. Civ. P. 257.
89. Id 257(a).
90. 623 S.W.2d at 771.
91. Id
92. Id
93. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976), amended by Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 406, 96 Stat. 1512-13
(1982). See generally Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963) (§ 94 specifies
the only courts in which a national bank can be sued).
94. Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 406, 96 Stat. 1512-13 (1982).
95. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983).
96. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185 (emphasis added).
97. 625 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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true" in certain particulars.98 Focusing on this language, the court of ap-
peals held that, because the answer did not use the exact language specified
for a partial denial of the account, it amounted to no more than a general
denial and failed to satisfy rule 185. 99
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Toman 1 o concerned the procedure to be
followed at a hearing on a plea in abatement in a defendant's answer.
Since the general rule places the burden on the party presenting a plea in
abatement to support the plea with evidence, the court of appeals con-
cluded that if no evidence is adduced, the plea is waived.' 0' Waiver does
not occur, however, if the plaintiff admits in his petition the truth of the
matters the defendant alleged in the plea.'0 2
A number of other cases involving questions with respect to pleadings
were decided during the survey period. For example, in Forderhause v.
Cherokee Water Co. 103 the Texarkana court of appeals considered a suit
on a written agreement, in which a counterclaim for reformation of such
agreement had been severed from the primary claim. The appellate court
held that the plea for reformation should not have been severed because it
constituted a compulsory counterclaim.'10 Since "[bjoth claims arise out
of the same transaction," it followed that "the counterclaim was required
to be filed in this suit" and "if it was necessary that it be filed in this suit, it
was also imperative that it be tried in the same cause."' 0 5 Finally, two
cases concluded that when the recovery of prejudgment interest was per-
mitted by law, a petition containing a general prayer for relief was suffi-
cient to support an award of such interest. 06
VII. LIMITATIONS
The discovery rule, which has been extended over the past decade to
cover a variety of types of actions, 0 7 provides that the statute of limita-
98. Id at 824 (emphasis added).
99. Id at 825; accord Crystal Invs. v. Manges, 596 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex. 1980).
100. 624 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Id at 679.
102. Id
103. 623 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ granted).
104. Id at 440-41.
105. Id. at 440; accord Bohart v. First Nat'l Bank, 536 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
106. Sanchez v. Matthews, 636 S.W.2d 455, 461 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ
refd n.r.e.); Arndt v. National Supply Co., 633 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Allison, 620 S.W.2d 207,
212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), rev'don other grounds, 624 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1981); Golden v.
Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); see also
Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 117 (Tex. 1978) (prejudg-
ment interest is recoverable as matter of right when an ascertainable sum of money is deter-
mined to have been due and payable at a date certain prior to judgment).
107. See, e.g., Thrift v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (breach
of warranty by drug manufacturer); Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976), noted in
Note, Kelley v. Rinkle. Texas Embraces the Discovery Rule in Credit Libel, 30 Sw. L.J. 950
(1976) (submission of false credit report by creditor); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.
1967) (foreign object left in body by surgeon); Atkins v. Crossland, 417 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.
1967) (negligent preparation of tax return by accountant); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Cas-
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tions will not start running until the plaintiff discovers the true facts giving
rise to his claimed damage or until the date discovery should reasonably
have been made. 0 8 Since its judicial inception in 1967,109 the rule most
frequently has operated in suits against doctors for medical malpractice
arising from negligently administered treatments. I1
Accordingly, in Wynn v. Mid- Cities Clinic I" the court of appeals applied
the discovery rule in a malpractice suit against a physician for allegedly
negligent administration of radiation treatments occuring twelve years
prior to the institution of suit. While no evidence suggested that the physi-
cian had misrepresented facts to the plaintiff, thereby preventing timely
discovery to institute a suit, the court found that the physician's withhold-
ing of information sufficiently justified invoking the discovery rule. 12
Two cases decided during the survey period concerned the effect of toll-
ing provisions on the applicable statute of limitations. In Johnson v. Mc-
Lean 1 3 the court of appeals considered the effect of article 55351 " 4 on
tolling the statute of limitations for imprisoned parties. Here, the prisoner
brought an action against his former attorney for negligent representation.
He did not serve the attorney, however, until three years after the alleged
cause of action arose. The court held that the suit was barred by the two-
year statute of limitations.-' Rejecting the prisoner's contention that arti-
cle 5535 tolled the running of the limitations period during his imprison-
tillo, 616 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (deceptive trade prac-
tices claim); see also Note, Limitations ofActions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 199 (1967). But see
McClung v. Johnson, 620 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (discovery rule
is inapplicable in legal malpractice suits).
108. See, e.g., Hayes v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972) (the statute of limitations
begins to run from the time of the discovery of the true facts or from the date it should, using
ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered); Anderson v. Sneed, 615 S.W.2d 898, 901
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ). See generally Figari, 1982.4nnual Survey, supra
note II, at 450.
109. The supreme court first pronounced the rule in Texas in Gaddis v. Smith, 417
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967).
110. See, e.g., Hayes v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972) (failure of a vasectomy opera-
tion); Newberry v. Tarvin, 594 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)
(negligent insertion of an I.U.D.); Conerly v. Morris, 575 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (negligent treatment of a fibroid tumor); Fitzpat-
rick v. Marlow, 553 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (negligent
nose surgery). But cf Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1977) (5-4 decision) (dis-
covery rule is inapplicable to action for negligent diagnosis).
111. 628 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
112. Id at 812.
113. 630 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
114. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides:
If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this subdivision of this
title be at the time the cause of action accrues . . . a person imprisoned...
the time of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the time limited
for the commencement of the action and such person shall have the same time
after the removal of his disability that is allowed to others by the provisions of
this title.
See Jenkins v. State, 570 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
115. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN, art. 5526, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) provides that
all actions for injury done to the person of another shall be commenced and prosecuted
within two years after the cause of action accrues.
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ment, the court observed that the tolling statute was intended to protect "a
legally disabled party who has no access to the courts, and to insure that
his right to bring suit will not be precluded by the running of a limitations
statute prior to the removal of his disability." ' 1 6 Accordingly, since the
prisoner actually filed the lawsuit during the term of his imprisonment, he
was not entitled to the protective provisions of article 5535. 117 Further-
more, the court held that once the prisoner elected to commence his suit he
was held to the same standard of diligence in prosecuting the suit as one
not so protected, notwithstanding the disability protection of article
5535. 118 Consequently, the prisoner's mere filing of the suit within the pe-
riod of limitations, unaccompanied by due diligence in procuring the issu-
ance and service of process on the defendant, was insufficient to interrupt
the running of the statute of limitations. 119
The court discussed the tolling effect of the Texas "saving statute"', 20 in
Long Island Trust Co. v. Dicker.12' Article 5539a permits an action filed
within the applicable limitations period, which is later dismissed for want
of jurisdiction, to be refiled in a court of proper jurisdiction within sixty
days of dismissal even if the statute of limitations has since expired. 22 In
Long Island Trust Co., a case of first impression, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the saving provision operates
even in actions dismissed from a court outside of Texas. 123 Since no lan-
guage in article 5539a restricts its application to cases dismissed in Texas
courts, the Fifth Circuit refused to so limit the scope of the statute. 124 Like-
wise, the court rejected the appellee's contention that article 5539a applied
only to cases dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning
instead that Texas courts would extend article 5539a to dismissals for lack
of personal jurisdiction. 125
During the survey period two recently amended limitations statutes
drew constitutional fire in causes of action arising prior to the effective
date of the amendments. In Sax v. Votteler 126 the court upheld former
article 5.82 of the insurance code, which provided a two-year limitation for
116. 630 S.W.2d at 793 (citing Adler v. Beverly Hills Hosp., 594 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, no writ)).
117. 630 S.W.2d at 793. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on prior federal and
state court holdings that art. 5535 should apply only to those prisoners who suffer under
actual disabilities and are unable to prosecute their civil suits from prison. See, e.g., Ste-
phens v. Curtis, 450 F. Supp. 141 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Blum v. Elkins, 369 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1963, no writ).
118. 630 S.W.2d at 794.
119. Id at 793-94; see Zale Corp. v. Rosenbau, 520 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1975); Rigo Mfg.
Co. v. Thomas, 458 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1970).
120. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958).
121. 659 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1981).
122. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958).
123. 659 F.2d at 647. The court noted that Texas law does not permit a question to be
certified to the state supreme court even though it has never before been addressed by either
the Texas courts or the federal courts interpreting Texas law. Id at 646 n.8.
124. Id. at 646-47.
125. Id. at 647.
126. 636 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ granted).
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filing malpractice suits against physicians carrying liability insurance, 127
against appellants' challenge that it contravened the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 28 Unlike the general
limitations statute, article 5.82 was not tolled during minority except for
the first six years of a claimant's life.' 29 Appellants, the parents of an
eleven-year-old allegedly victimized by a doctor's negligence, argued that
the statute, which barred their claim filed three years after the date of the
child's operation, treated minor medical malpractice claimants differently
from minor claimants in other tort actions. Rejecting the parents' claim
that the statute denied equal protection, the court of appeals concluded
that the state had a legitimate purpose in enacting the statute.130 In addi-
tion, the court rejected the appellant's claim that the statute violated the
due process guarantee. The court reasoned that the limitations period was
not so short as to deprive an injured plaintiff of a reasonable opportunity
to enforce his or her claim. 13'
The one-year statute of limitations governing paternity suits did not fare
as well and was declared unconstitutional by both the Texas and United
States Supreme Courts. Prior to its amendment section 13.01 of the Texas
Family Code barred paternity suits filed after an illegitimate child had
reached the age of one. 132 Because the statute thus erected a barrier to
suits by illegitimate children seeking support from their natural fathers,
and legitimate children encountered no similar barrier, the United States
Supreme Court in Mills v. Habluetzel133 held that the limitations statute
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 34
Three weeks later the Texas Supreme Court followed suit in In re
J.A.M. 135 Although the court previously had granted the writ of error in
127. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 330, § 1, at 864.
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The careful practitioner should note, however, that
the Texas Supreme Court has granted an application for writ of error in Sax for the purpose
of determining the constitutionality of the statute. See 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 154 (Jan. 8, 1983).
129. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4, repealed by 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 817,
§ 41.03, at 2064, imposed a two-year statute of limitations on all persons regardless of mi-
nority "except that minors under the age of six years [had] until their eighth birthday in
which to file." The essence of art. 5.82 was recodified as a part of § 10.01 of the Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i,
§ 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); however, the new statute is tolled during the first twelve
years of a minor's life.
130. 636 S.W.2d at 465. The court found that the statute's purpose was to provide an
insurance rate structure that would enable health care providers to secure liability insurance,
"thus avoiding a crisis peculiar to that of torts." Id. The court also observed that art. 5.82
had survived past challenges to its constitutionality based on a denial of equal protection.
Id., see Littlefield v. Hays, 609 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ); Wal-
lace v. Homan & Crimen, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
131. 636 S.W.2d at 463-64. In a dictum the court also stated that art. 5.82 did not violate
the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 464; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
132. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 476, § 13.01, at 1261-62. The amended version of the
statute provides a four-year statute of limitations. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1982-1983).
133. 102 S. Ct. 1549, 71 L. Ed. 2d 770 (1982).
134. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
135. 631 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1982).
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J.A.M in order to resolve a conflict between the courts of appeals, 36 it
postponed its decision pending the result in Mills.137 Both of the high
courts, however, carefully avoided any prejudgment of the amended stat-
ute's constitutionality.13 8
Personal injury suits are normally barred if not filed within two years of
the date of injury. ' 39 If a plaintiffs injuries result from defective products,
however, the plaintiff can avoid the two-year limitations period by filing
suit based on a breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. 40 The
suit would then be governed by the four-year contract limitations period
specified in the Texas Uniform Commercial Code. 141 Rothe v. Ford Motor
Co. 142 extended this rationale further, holding that the Code's four-year
statute of limitations likewise governs suits for breach of an express war-
ranty even if the plaintiff also seeks to recover damages for personal inju-
ries. 143 According to the Rothe decision, the language of section 2.715 of
the Code' 44 permits recovery for personal injuries in actions for breach of
either expressed or implied warranty.' 45
Article 5539c 46 extends the limitations period up to an additional thirty
days beyond the answer date on counterclaim or cross-claim that would
otherwise be barred by the applicable statute of limitations, provided that
the cross-claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the
basis of the plaintiffs suit. In Beaumont Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cain '47
the Beaumont court of appeals refused to apply article 5539c to a contribu-
tion action between tortfeasors. In Cain the driver of an automobile sued
the owner of a truck for damages resulting from a collision of the two
136. Compare In re J.A.M., 605 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981), afl'd,
631 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. 1982) (statute requiring paternity action to be brought within one year
of birth of illegitimate child is unconstitutional), with Texas Dep't of Human Resources v.
Hernandez, 595 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (suit brought
more than one year after birth of child was not timely), and Texas Dep't of Human Re-
sources v. Chapman, 570 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute
requiring paternity action to be brought within one year of birth of illegitimate child does
not deny due process).
137. 631 S.W.2d at 731.
138. 102 S. Ct. at 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 631 S.W.2d at
732.
139. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
140. See Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980), discussed in
Figari, 1981 Annual Survey, supra note 58, at 373-74.
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
142. 531 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
143. Id. at 194.
144. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides that
"[c]onsequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include... (2) injury to person
or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
145. 531 F. Supp. at 194.
146. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539c (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The statute was
intended to change the result in cases such as Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91
S.W.2d 313 (1936) (statute of limitations does not apply to defense operating merely as nega-
tion of plaintiffs asserted right to recover). See generally McElhaney, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 179, 192 (1970).
147. 628 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ reed n.r.e.). The holding in
Cain appears to be at odds with the prior decision in Smith v. Lone Star Cadillac, Inc., 470
S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ).
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vehicles. Two years after the suit was filed the plaintiff amended the peti-
tion to include a passenger in the car as an additional plaintiff. One year
later the defendant filed its cross-action against the driver of the car, seek-
ing indemnity or contribution for any sums that might be awarded to the
passenger. The trial court, however, sustained the driver's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the cross-action because the defendant did not file his
cross-action within the extended period under article 5539c, and the two-
year statute of limitations otherwise applicable had already expired. 148
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and reinstated the
cross-action on the grounds that the statute of limitations on the cross-
action did not begin to run until the truck owner's right of contribution
accrued. 149 The court observed that the statute of limitations to a claim for
contribution does not normally begin to run until one of two or more joint
tortfeasors has paid more than his share of a judgment. 50 Because the
claims in Cain were governed by article 2212a,' 5 1 the Texas comparative
negligence statute, the truck driver was required to assert his claim for
contribution in the primary suit. According to the court, the defendant did
just that; consequently, his potential right to contribution could not be cut
off by an erroneous application of article 5539a. 152
VIII. PARTIES
In three cases decided during the survey period, courts held that a liti-
gant waives his objection to a defect in the parties by failing to assert the
objection at the trial court level. For example, in Realtex Corp. v. Tyler'53
the court rejected appellee's contention that it should dismiss an appeal
brought by the plaintiff corporation because the corporation's charter had
been forfeited prior to the institution of suit for failure to pay the required
franchise tax.' 54 According to the court, the defendants waived the defect
in parties by failing to raise an objection in the trial court to the plaintiffs
capacity to bring the suit.' 55
The remaining two cases involved nonjoinder of an alleged indispensa-
148. The court of appeals noted that no statute of limitations had been specifically
pleaded by the driver of the car. Id at 100 n.1. Thus, it appears that the trial court's selec-
tion of a two-year limitations period was based on TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526, § 6
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
149. 628 S.W.2d at 100.
150. Id (citing City of San Antonio v. Talerico, 98 Tex. 151, 154, 81 S.W. 518, 520
(1904); Sims v. Southland Corp., 503 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)).
151. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
152. 628 S.W.2d at 101.
153. 627 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston lIst Dist.] 1981, no writ).
154. Id at 442; see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 171.251, .301, .302, .309 (Vernon 1982)
(forfeiture of corporate charter for failure to pay franchise taxes). If a corporation forfeits its
charter for failure to pay franchise taxes, it loses the right to sue or defend in Texas courts.
Id § 171.252(1).
155. 627 S.W.2d at 442 (citing Rimco Enters. Inc. v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 599 S.W.2d
362, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ refd n.r.e.); Frazier v. Waco Bldg. Ass'n,
61 S.W. 132, 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-1901, writ refd).
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ble party. In both instances the Texas Supreme Court held that the ab-
sence of the indispensable party did not require reversal of the trial court's
judgment because the defect in parties was raised for the first time on ap-
peal. 156 The plaintiff in Cox v. Johnson'57 sued to recover on a promissory
note the defendant had executed, but failed to join as an additional plain-
tiff the joint payee on the note. Relying on the supreme court's decision in
Petroleum Anchor Equiment v. Tyra,158 the court of appeals reversed the
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the trial court had commit-
ted fundamental error by proceeding to trial in the absence of an indispen-
sable party to the lawsuit.' 59  In a per curiam opinion refusing the
plaintiff's application for writ of error, the supreme court expressly disap-
proved the appellate court's reasoning.' 60 The court explained that
"[flundamental . . . error is a discredited doctrine" that survives today
only in those rare instances in which the record shows on its face that the
court lacked jurisdiction or the public interest was directly and adversely
affected.' 6 ' Consequently, the plaintiffs failure to join the indispensable
party did not require reversal of the judgment 62 since the defendant had
not raised the error in the trial court below, and the absence of an indis-
pensable party-plaintiff did not amount to fundamental error.' 63 Simi-
larly, in Pirtle v. Gregory,' 64 in which the defendant also raised the issue of
nonjoinder for the first time on appeal, the court refused to find that the
absence of an indispensable party-defendant from the suit constituted fun-
damental error.' 65 Reconfirming the view it expressed in Cooper v. Texas
Gulf Industries, Inc. 166 some eight years earlier, the court opined: "Under
the provisions of our present Rule 39 it would be rare indeed if there were
a person whose presence was so indispensable in the sense that his absence
deprives the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties already
joined."167
156. Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam); Pirtle v. Gregory,
629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam).
157. 638 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam).
158. 406 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1966).
159. 630 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982).
160. 638 S.W.2d at 867-68. The court of appeals had also cited as support its own hold-
ing in Hinojosa v. Love, 496 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ). Id
The supreme court also expressly disapproved that holding. 638 S.W.2d at 868.
161. 638 S.W.2d at 868 (citing Texas Indus. League v. Railway Comm'n, 633 S.W.2d 821
(Tex. 1982); Buckholts Indep. School Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. 1982); Pirtle v.
Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam)).
162. 638 S.W.2d at 868. The court refused to grant the writ of error, however, and up-
held the judgment of the court of appeals on other grounds. Id
163. Id. The court distinguished its prior holding in Tyra as being decided prior to the
date that amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure changed "our approach in
dealing with a defect of parties from one which emphasized jurisdiction to an approach
based solely upon pragmatic considerations." Id.
164. 629 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam).
165. Id at 920.
166. 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974).




Underscoring the effect of the 1977 amendments to rule 42,168 the court
in Atkinson v. Reid 169 held that a shareholder-plaintiff bringing a deriva-
tive action against a corporation was not required to satisfy the prerequi-
sites of rule 42; 170 rather, a plaintiff in a derivative suit need satisfy only
the requirements of article 5.14(B) of the Texas Business Corporation
Act.
17 1
Rule 42 was again the subject of judicial scrutiny in Amoco Production
Co. v. Hardy.172 The court focused specifically on subsection (b)(4) of the
rule, which provides, in part, that a case may be certified as a class action if
"the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members."'' 73 Pursuant to rule 42(b)(4) the trial court had certified as a
class action a suit brought by ten named plaintiffs against several oil com-
panies to recover royalties under various oil and gas leases. 174 On appeal
from the order of certification the defendants argued that the plaintiffs did
not show that questions of law or fact common to the class would
predominate over the individual questions involved in the suit. The court
of appeals agreed and ruled that the predominant questions posed by the
plaintiffs' claim affected class members individually, rather than the class
as a whole, because the class defined by the trial court consisted of over
2,000 persons holding interests in an almost equal number of separate
leases. 175 Acknowledging that the abuse of discretion standard governed
its review of the trial court's order certifying the class, 176 the court of ap-
peals concluded that the lower court had abused its discretion by failing to
apply rule 42(b)(4) properly to the substantially undisputed facts of the
case. 177
IX. DISCOVERY
The topic of discovery sanctions proved to be fertile ground for judicial
decisionmaking during the survey period, producing a harvest of cases. In
two of those cases the courts considered the propriety of entering a default
168. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42. Prior to 1977, rule 42 expressly applied to derivative suits. Tex.
R. Civ. P. 42 (Vernon 1975); see Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
29 Sw. L.J. 265, 272 (1975).
169. 625 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Ct. App-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
170. Id at 67; accord Zauber v. Murray Sav. Ass'n, 591 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1979), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 601 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1980), discussed in
Folladori, Corporations and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 225, 234
(1981).
171. 625 S.W.2d at 67; see TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.14(B) (Vernon 1980).
172. 628 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism'd).
173. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4).
174. 628 S.W.2d at 814-15.
175. Id at 817.
176. ld at 816 (citing Townplace Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. McMahon, 594 S.W.2d 172
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, writ reftd n.r.e.)).
177. 628 S.W.2d at 816. A trial judge abuses his discretion when he fails to apply the law
to substantially undisputed facts. See Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 518, 348 S.W.2d 517,
519 (1961); Birds Constr., Inc. v. Gonzalez, 595 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1981, no writ).
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judgment against the defendant as a sanction for his failure to answer in-
terrogatories. In Bass v. Duffey 178 the appellate court approved the trial
court's action in striking the defendant's pleadings and rendering a default
judgment, even though answers to the interrogatories were on file at the
time the trial court rendered the judgment. 179 According to the court, the
imposition of penalties or sanctions for failure or refusal of a party to com-
ply with the interrogatory rule 80 is a matter directed to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court, and such imposition can be set aside only upon a
showing of clear abuse of discretion.' 8 ' Although the defendant finally
submitted answers to the interrogatories after the plaintiff had filed its
third motion for sanctions, 8 2 the appellate court was not surprised that the
trial court eventually imposed the sanction of a default judgment.183 Not-
ing that the defendant did not once attempt to respond to the interrogato-
ries or request additional time before the due date for filing answers, but
instead did nothing until faced with the threat of sanctions, the court held
that the trial court's action did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 84
To similar effect was the decision in Pearson Corp. v. Wichita Falls Boys
Club Alumni Association, Inc. 185 Following the defendant's failure to an-
swer interrogatories within the requested period of time, the plaintiff filed
a motion to compel answers. After due notice and hearing the court
granted the plaintiff's motion and ordered the defendant to respond to the
interrogatories. Several months later the interrogatories were still unan-
swered, so the trial court, without further notice or a second hearing, ren-
dered a default judgment against the defendant. 86 On appeal, the
defendant complained that the trial court had abused its discretion by ren-
dering the default judgment without a second hearing. Characterizing the
recalcitrance exhibited by the defendant as "startling," the court of appeals
rejected the defendant's contention and held that the trial court was em-
powered to impose the severe sanctions of rule 215a187 because the defend-
178. 620 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
179. Id. at 849.
180. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
181. 620 S.W.2d at 849 (citing Meyer v. Trunks, 360 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1962); Young Cos.
v. Bayou Corp., 545 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ)).
182. After a hearing on each of the two prior motions for sanctions, the court ordered the
defendant to answer the remaining interrogatories within a specified period of time; how-
ever, the defendant failed to comply with the court's directive on both occasions, thus
prompting the third motion. 620 S.W.2d at 848. The answers finally filed were substantially
incomplete and unresponsive. Id at 849.
183. Id
184. Id The court distinguished the contrary holdings in Illinois Employer's Ins. Co. v.
Lewis, 582 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), writ ref'dn.r.e per curiam, 590 S.W.2d
119 (Tex. 1979), and Young Cos. v. Bayou Corp., 545 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1977, no writ), observing that the answers the defendant finally filed in those cases
were complete, and neither of the cases involved similar circumstances existing up to the
time sanctions were imposed. 620 S.W.2d at 849.
185. 633 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
186. Id. at 685. In granting the earlier motion to compel, however, the court said that
plaintiff would be entitled to a default judgment if the defendant did not comply with the
terms of the order. Id.
187. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215a(c) permits the court, on motion and notice, to render a default
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ant had wholly failed to answer any of the interrogatories the plaintiff had
propounded.' 88 The appellate court noted that if a party answers some
interrogatories, an order compelling further answers is a necessary predi-
cate to the imposition of sanctions. 8 9 If a party completely fails to answer
interrogatories, however, the propounding party may immediately move
for imposition of sanctions without first obtaining an order from the court
requiring answers to the interrogatories. 190 According to the appellate
court, therefore, the trial judge was authorized to render the default judg-
ment as early as the first hearing because the defendant failed to make any
response to the interrogatories. 191 Moreover, the defendant could not later
complain about the timing of the court's judgment, which had simply been
postponed to afford the defendant an additional opportunity to serve an-
swers.' 92 As in Bass, however, the decision in Pearson Corp. reversed the
portion of the judgment specifying an amount for damages. 193 In each
instance, the court held that the defendant was at least entitled to notice
and a hearing on the issue of damages since the plaintiffs claim was
unliquidated. '94
The courts upheld a different type of discovery sanction in Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co. 195 and Texas Industries, Inc. v. Lucas. 196 In both cases
a party's failure to disclose the identity of an expert witness in response to
interrogatories resulted in the exclusion of that witness's testimony at trial.
The problem arose in Duncan when in mid-trial the plaintiff tendered the
testimony of an expert witness who had not previously been identified in
response to defendant's pretrial interrogatories. The trial court postponed
the expert's testimony over the weekend to allow the defendant's attorneys
to depose him. When the trial resumed, the court allowed the plaintiff to
read portions of the expert's deposition into evidence over the objection of
the defendant.
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that, prior to its amendment, rule
168 did not provide specific sanctions for a party's failure to identify a
witness in answers to interrogatories requesting names of witnesses to be
judgment against a party that fails to serve answers to interrogatories after proper service of
such interrogatories. Other sanctions imposed by the rule include dismissal, striking the
pleading, or otherwise precluding the offending party from showing grounds for relief or
defense. Id
188. 633 S.W.2d at 686.
189. Id at 687; see Saldivar v. Facit-Addo, Inc., 620 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1981, no writ) (citing Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 590 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.
1979), for the rule that "if some interrogatory answers are filed, a motion to compel answers
is. . .required to impose sanctions under . . .Rule 168." 620 S.W.2d at 779).
190. 633 S.W.2d at 686; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 168; Lewis v. Illinois Employers Ins. Co., 582
S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 590 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.
1979); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Evans, 590 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
191. 633 S.W.2d at 685-86.
192. Id at 686-87 (by implication).
193. Id. at 687.
194. Id.; Bass, 620 S.W.2d at 849-50.
195. 632 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, writ granted).
196. 634 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
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called at trial. 197 The court, nevertheless, elected to follow recent Texas
decisions that have recognized the exclusion of the witness's testimony as
an appropriate sanction. 98 Although the court admitted that an aggrieved
party can be required to take such steps as deposing the witness to alleviate
the surprise resulting from the offer of an undisclosed expert witness's tes-
timony, 199 it concluded that the allowance of a weekend deposition during
a recess in the trial was an insufficient measure to minimize the problems
resulting from admission of the expert's testimony. 2°° Accordingly, the
court held that the district court's admission of the expert's testimony con-
stituted an abuse of discretion. 20'
In Texas Industries the trial court had likewise admitted testimony from
an expert witness whose identity the plaintiff had not previously disclosed
in response to the defendant's interrogatories. 20 2 Once again the trial court
had attempted to ease the burden on the defendant as a result of the sur-
prise testimony by allowing him to depose the witness for two hours the
night prior to his testimony. But unlike the situation in Duncan, the
amended version of rule 168203 governed the appeal in Texas Industries
and thus the appellate court found it unnecessary to attempt a balancing of
the parties' interests. Instead, the court simply held that the trial court had
abused its discretion since the testimony was admitted in direct contraven-
tion of the rule 168 mandate. 2°4 Although the court observed that rule 168
allows the testimony to be admitted for good cause, it ruled that the plain-
tiff had failed to show a compelling reason sufficient to require admission
of the expert's testimony. 20 5
197. 632 S.W.2d at 385 n.8; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 168. Although the amendments to rule
168 became effective on Jan. 1, 1981, the trial of the case apparently occurred earlier, and the
old version of the rule governed. The court noted, however, that under the amended version
of the rule, the witness would not have been allowed to testify since he was not named in
response to the defendant's interrogatories, and his identity was not disclosed at least 14
days prior to trial. 632 S.W.2d at 385 n.8; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(7)(a)(3).
198. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Meyer, 620 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1981, no writ), discussed in Figari, 1982 Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 456; Trubell v.
Patten, 582 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ), discussed in Figari, Texas
Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 415, 431-32 (1980).
199. 632 S.W.2d at 385 (citing Allied Fin. Co. v. Garza, 626 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ)).
200. 632 S.W.2d at 386.
201. Id The court also noted that federal courts have excluded testimony as a sanction
for violation of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4), which also permits discovery of the identity of
experts a party expects to call as trial witnesses., 632 S.W.2d at 385 n.9; see, e.g., Smith v.
Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980); Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155,
1157-60 (5th Cir. 1978).
202. 634 S.W.2d at 757.
203. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168(7)(a)(3) now provides:
[I]f the party expects to call an expert witness whose name and the subject
matter of such witness' testimony has not been previously disclosed in re-
sponse to an appropriate interrogatory, such answer must be amended. . . as
soon as practical, but in no event less than fourteen (14) days prior to the
beginning of trial except on leave of court. If such amendment is not timely
made, the testimony of the witness shall not be admitted in evidence unless the
trial court finds that good cause sufficient to require its admission exists.
204. 634 S.W.2d at 758; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
205. 634 S.W.2d at 758.
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Postjudgment discovery sanctions were the subject of Arndt v. Farris.2°6
Rule 621 a, which governs postjudgment discovery, provides, in part, that a
party obtaining a judgment may "initiate and maintain in the trial court in
the same suit in which said judgment was rendered any discovery proceed-
ing authorized by these rules for pretrial matters. '20 7 Pursuant to rules
621a and 215a the trial court in Arndt imposed severe sanctions on the
defendant, including holding him in contempt of court, for his failure to
appear at a postjudgment deposition.208 In a mandamus proceeding seek-
ing to vacate the order imposing sanctions, the defendant claimed that the
trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter the order because the plaintiff
had failed to file a new petition. The supreme court held, however, that
rule 62 1 a does not require a new petition as a predicate for initiating dis-
covery or seeking sanctions after judgment, and the defendant's applica-
tion for a writ of mandamus was therefore denied. 20 9 Recognizing that a
trial court's power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform a judgment ceases
thirty days after the judgment is signed,2 1 0 the supreme court nevertheless
concluded that the trial court's power to enforce its judgment is not so
limited.21 I According to the court, rule 621a is an aid to the enforcement
of judgments, and the "trial court has continuing jurisdiction over such
matters as set forth in the rule."'212
Two cases during the survey period discussed the scope of the attorney-
client privilege in the context of the discovery process. Shortly after an
accident that was the subject of suit, the defendant in Hiebert v. Weiss 21 3
made an oral statement to an investigator employed by the defendant's
insurance company. The statement, which the investigator had recorded,
was subsequently transcribed, and the insurance company forwarded a
copy of the statement to the attorney it had furnished for the defendant.
214
When the plaintiff sought to introduce the statement at trial, the trial court
refused to admit it in evidence. On appeal the plaintiff claimed that the
trial court's exclusion of the statement was improper because it constituted
a prior inconsistent statement by the defendant. The appellate court, how-
ever, ruled that the statement was not a proper object of discovery because
it constituted "privileged matter identical to the privilege which would
have existed had it been a statement initially given to an attorney [the
defendant] had himself later employed. '215 According to the court, the
defendant was entitled to the protection of rules 167 and 186a since the
206. 633 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. 1982).
207. TEX. R. Civ. P. 621a.
208. 633 S.W.2d at 498; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 215a, 621a.
209. 633 S.W.2d at 498.
210. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
211. 633 S.W.2d at 499; see Exparte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979); Hunt
Prod. Co. v. Burrage, 104 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937, writ dism'd).
212. 633 S.W.2d at 499.
213. 622 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Under the terms of the defendant's insurance policy, the insurance company was
obligated to and did provide counsel for the defendant.
215. 622 S.W.2d at 152; see also Gass v. Baggerly, 332 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1960, no writ).
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insurance company that obtained the statement from the defendant was
also obligated to provide counsel for the defendant. 216
In Bendele v. Tri-County Farmer's Co-op 21 7 the question presented was
"whether a party waives his attorney-client privilege when he complies
without objection to a pre-trial order requiring the production of privi-
leged matter. 218 Prior to trial the appellee in Bendele produced certain
privileged documents in compliance with an order compelling production
pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. The appellee did not move to quash
the subpoena, file a motion for protective order alleging the attorney-client
privilege, or object to evidence from the documents until the trial.219 The
appellate court held that under these circumstances the attorney-client
privilege was waived.220
In Couch v. Mallory22' the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to use dep-
ositions in a plea of privilege hearing that had been taken before one of the
defendants was joined as a party. The Corpus Christi court of appeals
found this ruling to be in error and refused to consider the depositions on
appeal in reviewing the proper venue of the action against the defendant
who was joined after the taking of the depositions. 222
Finally, in Carboni Houston, Inc. v. Exchange Bank 223 the court held
that an answer to a request for admission 224 that volunteers an unrespon-
sive explanation constitutes surplusage and is not evidence binding on the
requesting party.225 Further, the court reaffirmed that one defendant's ad-
missions are not legally admissible against any other defendant.226
X. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A number of decisions during the survey period discussed the types of
proof that will support or defeat a motion for summary judgment. At-
tempting to collect on a promissory note, the movant in Bailey v. Gui/way
National Bank 227 attached an unverified copy of the note to the maker's
216. 622 S.W.2d at 152; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 167, 186a. The court apparently concluded
that the statement therefore constituted a communication to an agent of the defendant made
after the occurrence upon which the suit was based.
217. 635 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio), affdinpart and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 641 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1982).
218. 635 S.W.2d at 464.
219. Id
220. Id
221. 638 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ dism'd).
222. See also Elizondo v. Tavarez, 596 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Heldt Bros. Trucks v. Silva, 464 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
223. 628 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
224. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 169.
225. 628 S.W.2d at 829; see also Halbert v. Sylvestine, 292 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1956, no writ); Mosby v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 191 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
226. 628 S.W.2d at 829 (citing Bryant v. Kimmons, 430 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1968, no writ)).
227. 626 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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deposition, pursuant to an agreement of the parties. 228 On appeal, the
maker of the note complained that no evidence existed showing that the
note was owned by the party who obtained a summary judgment in the
trial court. The court held that the maker had waived the point based on
his failure to object about this matter in the trial court, 2 2 9 and the admis-
sions he made during his deposition, including the parties' agreement to
allow attachment of a copy of the note.230
In an action to collect on a foreign judgment the nonmovant in Dousson
v. Disch23 1 claimed that summary judgment should not have been entered
because the certified copy of the foreign judgment, although filed, was not
attached to the motion. Although recognizing that rule 166-A(e) requires
"[s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit [to] be attached thereto," 232 the appellate court found no provi-
sion in the rule that "requires summary judgment evidence to be attached
to the motion for summary judgment. ' 233 Accordingly, the court found
the nonmovant's argument to be without merit. 234 Land Liquidators of
Texas, Inc. v. Houston Post Co. 235 held that an affidavit required to sup-
port a summary judgment must be made on the personal knowledge of the
affiant and, pursuant to rule 166-A(e), "must show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. ' 236 Moreover,
the affidavit must not merely state that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated in the affidavit, but "there must be something in the
affidavit to show affirmatively how the affiant is competent to testify on"
those matters. 237 Finding neither requirement satisfied in this case, the
appellate court reversed a summary judgment against the appellant. 238 Fi-
228. Id. at 72.
229. Id TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c), which governs summary judgment practice, provides,
in part, that "[i]ssues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or
other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal." See also City of
Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979) (nonmovant's agreement
to submission of motion for summary judgment on single issue precluded nonmovant from
later urging on appeal an issue not presented at trial court level). The court in Bailey also
noted:
Where unverified or uncertified copies are attached to pleadings on a
motion for summary judgment and no exception is taken, the party thereby
waives the requirement under Rule 166-A(e) and the copies are sufficient basis
to grant a motion for summary judgment when it fairly appears there is no
genuine issue as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.
626 S.W.2d at 72.
230. 626 S.W.2d at 73; see also 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.2611 (rev.
1971).
231. 629 S.W.2d IlI (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
232. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
233. 629 S.W.2d at 112. But see Corpus Christi Mun. Gas Corp. v. Tuloso-Midway In-
dep. School Dist., 595 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
234. 629 S.W.2d at 112.
235. 630 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ).
236. Id. at 714; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
237. 630 S.W.2d at 714 (emphasis added).
238. Id at 715.
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nally, the court in Denton Construction Co. v. Mike's Electric Co. 239 recog-
nized a proposition that is often overlooked by the trial practitioner: A
party upon whom a request for admission has been served may not affirm-
atively use his response to the request to defeat a motion for summary
judgment.240
Rule 166-A(c) 241 provides that a party opposing a summary judgment
may file and serve opposing affidavits or other written response "not later
than seven days prior to the day of heariig. ' 242 In Small v. Harper243 the
opposing party filed an affidavit on the day of the summary judgment
hearing without obtaining the court's prior permission. 244 Recognizing
that the trial court had the discretion to consider the belated affidavit, 245
the appellate court concluded that the affidavit had been taken into ac-
count in ruling on the motion because the lower court's judgment con-
tained the following recitation: "having considered all of the pleadings and
summary judgment evidence adduced in support of and in opposition to said
Motion .... ,"246 Thus, the appellate court held the affidavit was part of
the summary judgment record and demonstrated a genuine issue of fact,
which precluded the granting of a summary judgment. 247
The decision in Copy Service, Inc. v. Bob Hamric Chevrolet, Inc. 248 con-
sidered the presumption of a final judgment in the context of a motion for
summary judgment. On appeal from the entry of a favorable summary
judgment the appellee claimed that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction
because the trial court's judgment was not final in light of a pending cross-
action the appellant had filed, which had not been disposed of in the trial
court. Relying on earlier case authority, however, the appellate court con-
cluded that if the trial court renders a judgment, not intrinsically interlocu-
tory in character, and fails to order a separate trial under rule 174,249 then
"it will be presumed for all appeal purposes that the [trial] court intended
to, and did, dispose of all parties legally before it and of all issues made by
the pleadings between such parties. ' 250 Finding the presumption to be ap-
plicable, the court considered the merits of the appeal.
239. 621 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
240. Id. at 848; accord Americana Motel, Inc. v. Johnson, 610 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1980);
Oliver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 456 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
241. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c).
242. Id
243. 638 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1982, no writ).
244. Id. at 28.
245. Id.,. see Majestic Bldg. Corp. v. McClelland, 559 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [Ist Dist.] 1977, no writ); Metze v. Entman, 584 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
246. 638 S.W.2d at 29 (emphasis in original).
247. Id at 30.
248. 629 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
249. TEX. R. Civ. P. 174.
250. 629 S.W.2d at 172 (quoting North East Indep. School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d
893, 897-98 (Tex. 1966)).
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XI. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
A number of decisions during the survey period focused on the scope of
submission of special issues under rule 277,251 which abolished the former
requirement that special issues be submitted distinctly and separately. 2 2
Rule 277 now provides that "[i]t shall be discretionary with the court
whether to submit separate questions with respect to each element of a case
or to submit issues broadly [and] [i]t shall not be objectionable that a ques-
tion is general or includes a combination of elements or issues. ' 253 Giving
this language full effect, a number of earlier cases had opened the door to a
broadened use of special issues.254 The action of the trial court in Mont-
gomery Ward & Co. v. Hernandez,255 however, seems to have torn the door
from its hinges. In Hernandez, a false imprisonment case, the trial court
virtually submitted the plaintiffs entire cause of action in a single issue
inquiring: "What amount of money, if any,. . . do you find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence would reasonably compensate [plaintiff] for
damages directly resulting from the false imprisonment, if any, on the oc-
casion in question," followed by an instruction on damages and a defini-
tion of "false imprisonment. '256 While ackowledging that rule 277
encourages the use of broad special issues, the court of appeals neverthe-
less interpreted the submission as assuming the controverted fact of false
imprisonment, apparently because it tended to direct the jury's attention
solely to the question of damages. 257 Furthermore, since the accompany-
ing definition failed to include one of the contested elements of false im-
prisonment, the appellate court found that the jury had been foreclosed
from deciding an omitted issue. 258
Under former practice the trial judge was required to frame his charge
so that he did "not therein comment on the weight of the evidence. '259
The 1973 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure deleted this
phrase,260 and the rules now only prohibit the trial judge from comment-
251. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
252. See Tex R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 1967). See generaly Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111
Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
253. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277; see Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict-1979, 11
ST. MARY'S L.J. I (1979); Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special Verdict Sys-
tem for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973).
254. See, e.g., Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 924 (Tex. 1981) (broad sub-
mission of negligence issue upheld); Brown v. American Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d
931, 937 (Tex. 1980) (reiterated purpose of 1973 amendment to rule 277 was to abolish "sep-
arate and distinct" requirement in issue submission); Siebenlist v. Harville, 596 S.W.2d 113,
114-15 (Tex. 1980); Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 775-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980,
writ refd n.r.e.); Del Monte Corp. v. Martin, 574 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ); Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shasteen v. Mid-Continent Ref. Co., 517 S.W.2d
437, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).
255. 644 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ granted).
256. Id at 760.
257. Id at 761.
258. Id at 760.
259. Tex. R. Civ. P. 272 (Vernon 1967).
260. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272; see Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 36 TEX. B.J. 495 (1973).
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ing directly on the weight of the evidence. 261 Considering a special issue
asking the jury to determine "[w]hose negligence, if any, . . . caused the
incident," followed by a list of the parties inquired about, the court in
Hersh v. Hendley262 ruled that the inclusion of the words "if any" pre-
vented the submission from being a direct comment on the weight of the
evidence.
263
With respect to the requirements for making objections to the court's
charge, rule 272 stipulates that "objections shall in every instance be
presented to the court in writing [and] [a]ll objections not so presented
shall be considered as waived. ' 264 Despite the further statement in the
rule that "[t]he judge shall announce his rulings thereon before reading the
charge to the jury,"265 Williams v. Meyer266 indicates that the burden is on
the objecting counsel to insure that such ruling is made at that time and is
included in the record.267 In Williams, when counsel for the defendant
had concluded his objections to the charge, the trial court replied "I'll let
you know at 1:15," but the record failed to reflect that the trial court had
ever acted on the objection before reading the charge to the jury. Con-
cluding that counsel had failed to make the requisite showing under rule
272, the court found the objections to have been waived. 268
XII. JURY PRACTICE
Rule 216 requires that a jury demand be made, and the jury fee be paid
"on or before appearance day or, if thereafter, a reasonable time before the
date set for trial of the cause on the nonjury docket, but not less than ten
days in advance. '269 Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of this ten-
day limit, Texas courts have construed the rule as being discretionary with
the trial court.270 Following these prior decisions, the court in Dawson v.
Jarvis271 held that a denial of a late fee payment will be sustained on ap-
peal unless the complaining party shows "(1) that the granting of the late
request would not interfere with the orderly handling of the court's docket,
(2) delay the trial of the case, or (3) operate to the injury of the opposite
party. '272 Finding that each of these criteria had been satisfied, the appel-
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
262. 626 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
263. Id at 155.
264. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272.
265. Id.
266. 629 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
267. Id at 259; accord Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Clapper, 605 S.W.2d 938, 940
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1980, no writ); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Dahlstrom Corp.,
568 S.W.2d 733, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
268. 629 S.W.2d at 259.
269. TEx. R. Civ. P. 216.
270. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Joyce, 459 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970,
writ ref d n.r.e.); First Bankers Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 417 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1967, no writ); Lebman v. Sullivan, 198 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
271. 627 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
272. Id at 446-47.
[Vol. 37
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
late court determined that the trial court had abused its discretion by deny-
ing a jury trial to the defendants, who had offered to pay the jury fee on
the day of the trial.273
A significant supreme court decision on jury misconduct is Flores v.
Dosher.274 In this medical malpractice case plaintiffs moved for a new
trial on the basis of a statement made by one or more jurors that it did not
matter how the jury answered a special issue inquiring whether the doc-
tor's negligence was a proximate cause of the patient's death "because
plaintiffs would recover in any event. ' 275 In order to establish sufficient
grounds for a new trial for jury misconduct the court recognized that the
plaintiffs must establish "(1) that misconduct occurred; (2) that it was ma-
terial misconduct and (3) that based on the record as a whole, the miscon-
duct probably resulted in harm to them. ' 276 Based on the testimony of
two jurors who had changed their votes after hearing the statements, the
supreme court concluded that the standard had been met and, accordingly,
ordered a new trial.277
A number of decisions addressed the propriety of certain types of state-
ments made in closing arguments in a jury trial. In Texas General Indem-
nity Co. v. Moreno,278 a workmen's compensation case, the defendant
complained about two statements the plaintiff's counsel had made in his
closing argument. First, the plaintiffs counsel had implied that the de-
fendant should have "taken the money the legislature had provided for
this man and paid it to him rather than paying this [defendant's] lawyer to
sit over here."' 279 The second argument effectively stated that the defend-
ant had not paid the benefits because the money had been invested and
loaned out "at 22 percent. ' 280 Finding that the defendant's counsel had
invited the first argument by making similar arguments and that the sec-
ond argument was harmless, the appellate court refused to grant a new
trial on the ground of improper jury argument.28'
In another workers' compensation case, American Home Assurance Co.
v. Coronado,282 the plaintiffs attorney attacked the defendant and his
counsel for failing to produce their doctors' medical testimony and chal-
lenged the jury to conclude from their absence that had they appeared and
testified, they could have provided evidence adverse to defendant. Con-
cluding that the argument complained of was curable, the appellate court
held that the defendant had waived any error by his failure to object and
273. Id at 447.
274. 622 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. 1981).
275. Id at 574.
276. Id; accord Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. 1980); Fountain v. Fer-
guson, 441 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. 1969).
277. 622 S.W.2d at 575.
278. 638 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
279. Id. at 912.
280. Id. at 913.
281. Id
282. 628 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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request an instruction for the jury to disregard the statements. 283
Finally, in Missouri Valley, Inc. v. Putman 284 an employee's widow and
children sought exemplary damages from an employer for its gross negli-
gence in removing a rope barricade around a floor opening, which caused
the employee to fall to his death through the opening. In closing argument
the widow's attorney exhibited a rope and hangman's noose to the jury.
Concluding that the trial court's denial of a new trial was not an abuse of
discretion, the court ruled that the widow's counsel had not "hung" him-
self by displaying the hangman's noose to the jury.285
During the survey period two decisions considered issues relating to the
jury selection process. In Garcia v. Texas Employers' Insurance Associa-
tion 286 an unsuccessful workers' compensation claimant contended that he
was denied a constitutionally representative jury in that the percentage of
Mexican-Americans on the jury panels was far lower than the percentage
of Mexican-Americans in the county of the suit. Recognizing that the pro-
cess of selecting jury panels from voter registration lists by the use of jury
wheels is constitutional unless it systematically and arbitrarily excludes a
cognizable class,2 87 the court held that a showing that an identifiable group
was underrepresented on the jury panel by as much as ten percent was not
enough to prove purposeful discrimination based on race alone.288 Fur-
ther, the claimant's testimony that the Texas Employers' Insurance Associ-
ation purposely and systematically strikes all Mexican-Americans from
jury panels was an insufficient basis for "the denial of the right, guaranteed
by law, to preemptorily eliminate members of the panel for any reason that
seems adequate to counsel in seeking a fair and impartial jury. ' 2 89 In Jen-
kins v. Chapman290 an automobile accident case, the plaintiffs counsel,
during voir dire, inquired as to whether any member of the panel had
worked for an adjusting company. The court of appeals determined that
such a question was not improper.29' The same court also held that a
juror's inability to read or write, which was discovered after trial, does not
constitute reversible error, especially when the juror possesses an under-
standing of the English language. 292
283. Id. at 824; accord Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. 1968).
284. 627 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
285. Id. at 834.
286. 622 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
287. Id. at 630; accord United States v. Ault, 567 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 911 (1978).
288. 622 S.W.2d at 631; see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965). The court
also pointed out that the claimant had waived his challenge to the array of the jury panels by
failing to file a verified motion before the trial on the merits. 622 S.W.2d at 630 n.3; see TEX.
R. Civ. P. 221.
289. 622 S.W.2d at 631; see Tamburello v. Welch, 392 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1965).
290. 636 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1982, writ dism'd).
291. Id at 240.
292. Id;see Mitchell v. Burleson, 466 S.W.2d 646 ('rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ
retd n.r.e.); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Mitchell, 423 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1967, no writ). TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2133 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
governs juror qualification and provides, as one of its requirements, that a juror must be able




Rule 21 c provides, in part, that an extension of time may be granted for
the late filing of a transcript and statement of facts in the court of appeals
if "a motion reasonably explaining the need therefor is filed within fifteen
(15) days of the last date for filing."' 293 On the other hand, rule 386 pro-
vides, in effect, that the late filing of a transcript or statement of facts shall
not affect the jurisdiction of the court of appeals.294 Resolving an apparent
conflict between the two rules, the supreme court in B.D. Click Co. v. Sa-
fari Drilling Corp. 295 held that a court of appeals did not have authority to
grant a motion to extend the time for filing of the record in the absence of
a timely rule 21c motion. 296 Recognizing that rule 21c accomplishes "an
important purpose by fixing the date a judgment becomes final," the court
disapproved certain decisions that had held the fifteen-day time limit
under rule 21c was not mandatory. 297 Following the lead of Click, the
court of appeals in Carrao v. Committee of Unauthorized Practice of Law,
State Bar of Texas298 held that rule 21c also prohibits the appellate court
from considering a motion for rehearing of a denial to extend the time for
filing the record if the motion is not filed within the fifteen-day time
limit.2 9 9
With respect to the preparation of a statement of facts by the court re-
porter, the supreme court in Pat Walker & Co. v. Johnson 300 determined
that a writ of mandamus could not be issued to compel the reporter to
provide a statement of facts to a party.30' Appealing from an order over-
ruling a plea of privilege, the defendant in Smith v. Sun-Belt Aviation,
Ltd 302 attempted to obtain a statement of facts for the plea of privilege
hearing. The statement of facts was unavailable because no court reporter
was present during the hearing. Reversing the case for a new venue hear-
ing, the court followed the rule that if "after the exercise of due diligence"
a party "is unable to procure a statement of facts, his right to have the case
reviewed on appeal can be preserved for him in no other way than by
retrial of the cause. 30 3
293. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c. Id 437 also provides, in part, that a court may not make "any
enlargement of the time for filing transcript and statement of facts except pursuant to rule
21c."
294. TEX. R. Civ. P. 386.
295. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 346 (June 2, 1982).
296. Id at 348; accordIn re Brazil, 621 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no
writ); Briscoe v. Gulf Supply Co., 612 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
297. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 347. The court disapproved of the holdings in Wallace v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 624 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ), and
Exposition Apartments Co. v. Barba, 624 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
298. 638 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
299. Id at 184.
300. 623 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1981).
301. Id. at 308.
302. 625 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd).
303. Id (quoting Goodman v. Goodman, 611 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1981, no writ)).
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In River & Beach Land Corp. v. O'Donnell3°4 the court considered the
circumstances under which a party may accept the benefits of a judgment
and still appeal. Pursuant to the trial court's judgment of recision the ap-
pellant received certain promissory notes and informed another party that
it was now the owner of one of the notes. Recognizing the general rule
that "[a] litigant who has voluntarily accepted the benefits of a judgment
cannot afterward prosecute an appeal," 30 5 the court noted two narrow ex-
ceptions: "First, if a reversal of the judgment could not possibly affect an
appellant's right to the benefit accepted. . . . Second. . .where the eco-
nomic circumstances of the appellant were such that acceptance of the
benefits were [sic] not considered voluntary. ' 30 6 Finding neither exception
applicable, the court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss the
appeal.307
Stephens v. Stephens 30 8 considered the appellate standard for reviewing
a trial judge's denial of a request to reopen a case to receive additional
evidence. The court noted that the matter is within the discretion of the
trial judge and stated that such ruling "would not be interfered with on
appeal except for abuse. ' '3°9 The court also pointed out that the moving
party must lay a predicate in order to complain about this issue on ap-
peal.310 According to the court, the lower court must continue to have
control over the cause when the movant makes his request to reopen and,
by such request, the moving party must specify the new evidence to be
established. 3"1
Preservation of cross-points of errors was the subject of Cameo Construc-
tion Co. v. Campbell.312 By a cross-point the appellees claimed that the
trial court erred in failing to award them treble damages under the Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act. Finding that the appellees had failed to make
any objection about this point in the record during the trial court proceed-
ings, the court of appeals held that the appellees had waived the cross-
point.3' 3
Finally, rule 452,314 concerning the publication of court of appeals deci-
sions, has been amended. Under the new rule an opinion shall be pub-
lished only if, in the judgment of the justices participating in the decision,
the judgment is one which: (1) establishes a new rule of law; (2) alters or
modifies an existing rule; (3) applies an existing rule to a novel fact situa-
tion likely to occur in future cases; (4) involves a legal issue of continuing
304. 632 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Ct. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
305. Id at 888; accord Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950).
306. 632 S.W.2d at 888; accord Haggard v. Haggard, 550 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
307. 632 S.W.2d at 888.
308. 625 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
309. Id at 430.
310. Id
311. Id.
312. 642 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
313. Id at 13.
314. Tnx. R. Civ. P. 452.
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public interest; (5) criticizes existing law; or (6) resolves an apparent con-
flict of authority. Further, the amended rule provides that unpublished
opinions shall not be cited as authority by counsel or the court.
XIV. RES JUDICATA
As noted in a prior Survey, 315 a number of cases have held that mutual-
ity of parties is no longer required in Texas for application of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel.316 Expanding on these decisions, the court in Bon-
niwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp. 317 held that a defendant airplane manufac-
turer could use the doctrine of collateral estoppel offensively to obtain
judgment on its cross-claim against a co-defendant for indemnity and con-
tribution because the necessary issues of fact had been adjudicated in a
previous action involving a different plaintiff.318 Bonniwell was one of five
lawsuits resulting from a fatal airplane crash. The plaintiff joined both the
airplane manufacturer and the air carrier that operated the plane as de-
fendants in the suit, and each of those defendants filed a cross-claim for
indemnity and contribution against the other. One of the other lawsuits
stemming from the accident, however, proceeded to trial first. The judg-
ment in that earlier suit, which involved the same defendants as Bonniwell
and identical causes of action, denied the manufacturer's claim for indem-
nity from the air carrier but only because the jury's fact findings absolved
the manufacturer of all liability for the crash. Noting that a judgment for
indemnity or contribution necessarily requires a prior determination of lia-
bility issues, the court of appeals in Bonniwell concluded that the essential
issue of fact between the defendants on their cross-claims had already been
determined in the earlier litigation. 319 Consequently, the court affirmed a
summary judgment on the manufacturer's cross-claim based on the doc-
trine of res judicata even though a plaintiff who was not a party to the
earlier litigation brought the suit.3 20
Of perhaps greater significance in Bonniwell was the court's offensive
application of the collateral estoppel doctrine. The court acknowledged
that no previous Texas case had specifically endorsed an offensive use of
collateral estoppel321 even though such a use of the doctrine had been ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court more than three years before
in Parklane Hosiery Co. Inc. v. Shore.322 Nevertheless, the court did not
315. See Figari, 1982,Annual Survey, supra note 11, at 667.
316. See, e.g., Tobbon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 616 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Olivarez v. Broadway Hardware, Inc., 564
S.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); Hardy v. Flem-
ing, 553 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
317. 633 S.W.2d 553, 558 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ granted).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 559.
320. Id. at 560-61.
321. Id at 558.
322. 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979). In Parklane the Court held that the doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel could be applied offensively provided the defendant received a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the prior suit, suffered no procedural disadvantages because of an
1983]
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
hesitate in adopting the Parklane rationale, observing that the policies the
Supreme Court identified as supporting an offensive use of the doctrine
were identical to those espoused in recent Texas cases.323 The careful
practitioner should note, however, that the Texas Supreme Court has
agreed to review the decision of the court of appeals in Bonniwell.324
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
Attorneys' Fees. A number of decisions during the survey period ad-
dressed issues related to the recovery of attorneys' fees. In Boehringer
Mannheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 325 the
court held that a complaint, which contained a specific demand for pay-
ment, was sufficient to comply with the thirty-day demand requirement
under article 2226,326 the Texas statute that authorizes recovery of attor-
neys' fees in specified cases. The cautious practitioner, however, should
note that this case appears to be in conflict with a number of Texas deci-
sions holding that the act of filing suit does not meet the demand require-
ment under the statute.327  Schepps Grocery Co. v. Burroughs Corp. 328
addresses a problem that often arises in proving the amount of recoverable
attorneys' fees, that of allocation of attorneys' fees among various claims.
Appealing from an adverse judgment that allowed recovery of amounts
owed under a contract, the appellant claimed that the trial court had erred
in awarding attorneys' fees because the "appellee's attorneys failed to allo-
cate the time spent in prosecuting the claim and in defending" a usury
counterclaim. 329 Distinguishing this case from other cases that involved
several distinct theories for which there was no overlap in preparation, 330
opportunity unavailable in the previous litigation, and did not risk the possibility of incon-
sistent decisions. Id
323. 633 S.W.2d at 559 (citing Windmill Dinner Theatre v. Hagler, 582 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ dism'd); Olivarez v. Broadway Hardware, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 195
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.); Hardy v. Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
324. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 409, 413 (July 7, 1982).
325. 531 F. Supp. 344 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
326. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
327. See, e.g., Sterling Constr. Co. v. West Tex. Equip. Co., 597 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ); European Import Co. v. Lone Star Co., 596 S.W.2d 287,
291 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ refd n.r.e.). The court in Boehringer
also held that the rate of prejudgment interest was within the equitable discretion of the
court. 531 F. Supp. at 354; see Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Bd. v. Combustion
Equip. Assocs., Inc., 623 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1980). Accordingly, the court used a seven
percent rate rather than a six percent rate applicable to written contracts and open accounts
under art. 5069-1.03. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
In connection with postjudgment interest it should be noted that federal courts are now
authorized to award interest on judgments at the 52-week treasury bill rate, which has been
generally higher than the nine percent postjudgment rate prescnbed by the Texas statute.
Compare Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 302, 96 Stat. 25,
55-56 (1982), with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
328. 635 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).
329. Id at 611.
330. See International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973) (attorneys'
fees were limited to statutory allowance for prosecution of insurance claim and not for time
involved pertaining to fraud claim); Kosberg v. Brown, 601 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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the court concluded that allocation was not required as the usury claim
was both a defense to the principal suit and the basis for the counter-
claim.331 Accordingly, an overlap among the claims existed, and the ap-
pellee was entitled to recover fees for all legal services performed in the
case.
33 2
For the attorney who believes that the rate of a contingent fee is simply
a matter between the attorney and his client, Hoffert v. General Motors
Corp. 333 provides a warning to the contrary. In this personal injury action
involving a minor the trial court reduced a law firm's contingent fee from
one-third to one-fifth of the recovery after the parties had reached a settle-
ment of the action. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the trial court had
jurisdiction to limit the amount of the contingent fee and had acted prop-
erly in doing so based on the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association. 334 The relevant provisions of the Code are
based upon Canon 13 of the old ABA Canons of Ethics, which provided
that a contract for a contingent fee "should always be subject to the super-
vision of a court, as to its reasonableness. '335
Representation by More than Two Attorneys. Rule 9336 contains a little
known provision regarding the number of attorneys who may represent a
party in an action. Rule 9 provides that "[n]ot more than 2 counsel on
each side shall be heard on any question or on the trial, except in impor-
tant cases, and on special leave of the court. ' 337 In Ford Motor Co. v.
Nowak 338 a party attempted to complain on appeal about a violation of
rule 9. Finding that the complaint had not been registered until midway
through trial, the court of appeals ruled that the point had been waived for
purposes of the appeal. 339
Admission of Video Tapes. In re TL.H 340 addressed the procedure for
introducing video tapes or tape recordings during trial. Relying on earlier
cases that involved impeachment through the use of tape recordings, 341 the
Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (duty on party asserting cause of action to segregate fees
connected with causes of action for which attorneys' fees can be recovered from those from
which they cannot be recovered); see also Bray v. Curtis, 544 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (attorneys' fees only recoverable when provided by
statute or contract).
331. 635 S.W.2d at 611.
332. Id.
333. 656 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981).
334. Id at 165-66; see Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 2-20, DR 2-106
(1979). In addition, the court also noted that the trial judge has broad equity power to
supervise the collection of attorneys' fees under a contingent fee arrangement. 656 F.2d at
165-66.
335. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 13 (1908).
336. TEx. R. Civ. P. 9.
337. Id
338. 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
339. Id at 598.
340. 630 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Ct. App.--Corpus Christi 1982, writ dism'd).
341. See Seymour v. Gillespie, 608 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1980); Cummings v. Jess Edwards,
Inc., 445 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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court espoused the following seven factors to be taken into account in de-
termining the admissibility of tape recordings:
(1) that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2) that the operator of the device was competent;
(3) the authenticity of the correctness of the recording;
(4) that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;
(5) the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6) the identification of the speakers; and
(7) that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any
kind of inducement.342
Finding that the foregoing factors had not been satisfied, the appellate
court concluded that reversible error had been committed by allowing the
introduction of tape recordings in this child custody case.343
Notice of Trial Setting. Rule 245344 provides that the court may set con-
tested cases for trial with reasonable notice to the parties of not less than
ten days. In P. Bosco & Sons Contracting Corp. v. Conley, Lott, Nichols
Machinery Co. 345 the clerk of the court notified the parties of a trial setting
by postcard. Apparently, the customary practice in Dallas County had
been to notify counsel of a trial setting by postcard.346 Relying on rule
21a,347 which governs notice requirements under the rules of procedure
and generally requires notice "in person or by registered mail, or in any
other manner as directed by the court," the court of appeals determined
that the postcard notice was insufficient and, thus, overturned a judgment
entered against a defendant who complained about lack of notice of the
trial setting.348 The appellate court, however, noted that the postcard
method may be sufficient in the future if the trial judge actually directs
notice in such a manner.349
Disqualification of Trial Judge. In Whittington v. Whittington350 the court
was called upon to consider the issue of whether the presiding judge of the
district could assign a retired district judge, who had been defeated for
reelection, to hear the trial of a divorce case. Although article 200a351 im-
plicitly prohibits the assignment of former district judges who have been
defeated for reelection, the court of appeals concluded that the term "re-
tired" district judge was not equivalent to "former" district judge and,
thus, found no basis for disqualification. 352
342. 630 S.W.2d at 447.
343. Id. at 448.
344. TEX. R. Civ. P. 245.
345. 629 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
346. Id at 143.
347. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a.
348. 629 S.W.2d at 144.
349. Id
350. 638 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ dism'd).
351. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 5a (Vernon Supp. 1982).
352. 638 S.W.2d at 93; see Taylor v. State, 599 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980);
Todd v. State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Jackson v. State, 567 S.W.2d
222, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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